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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the trial court err when it found that the Defendant did not establish "good cause"
for setting aside the default certificate?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Gar}7 D. Jenkins leased one of Defendant Big Bubba's trailers. Later
Plaintiff, Mar}7 Ann Jenkins, attempted to lower the trailer ramp and suffered injuries when
the ramp suddenly fell and struck her on the head. Ms. Jenkins went to the emergency room
at McKay-Dee Hospital, presenting with neck pain, headache, and confusion. Ms. Jenkins
has since been diagnosed with chronic post concussive syndrome, including short-term
memory loss, concentration problems, tinnitus, and poor judgment; which has resulted in a
12% whole person impairment rating.
On April 15, 2009, Plaintiff sent a demand letter to Defendant, but received no
response. On April 21, 2009, Plaintiff sent a second demand letter to Defendant, but again
received no response. Defendant's manager was served with a summons and complaint at
its new business location on July 10, 2009. Due to circumstances completely within its
control, Defendant did not file an answer to the complaint and on October 27, 2009, a
certificate of default was entered against Defendant. On April 23, 2010, after having the
complaint in its possession for over nine months, Defendant filed an answer and moved to
have the default certificate set aside. Both Plaintiff and Defendant submitted memoranda,
and after hearing, the trial court ruled that pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c)

1

and applicable case law. the Defendant had not established good cause or excusable neglect
for its inaction. Consequently, the default certificate was not set aside.
Despite having knowledge of Plaintiff s claims for a period of over twelve months and
the complaint for a period of nine months, and despite its pattern of ignoring those claims,
Defendant argues that the default should be set aside for circumstances over whieh it had
complete control.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On April 2, 2007, Plaintiff Man' Ann Jenkins was attempting to lower the ramp
on a trailer that was manufactured by Defendant Big Bubba's Trailers. (R. 8)
2. Ms. Jenkins pulled the trailer ramp locking pin, and the ramp immediately fell and
struck her on the head, knocking her unconscious to the ground. (R. 8J
3. Ms. Jenkins was treated at the McKay-Dee Hospital emergency room for neck
pain, headache, and confusion. (Exhibit 10 to Petition for Interlocutory Appeal)
4. Ms. Jenkins w7as later diagnosed by Dennis J. Wyman, M.D. with chronic post
concussive syndrome, including short-term memory loss, concentration problems, tinnitus,
and poor judgment; which has resulted in a 12% whole person impairment rating. (R. 158163)
5. Prior to filing their Complaint, Plaintiffs sent a demand letter to Defendant's
Registered Agent, James Hockersmith on April 15, 2009. (R. 19; attached Addendum A)
6. On April 21,2009, Plaintiffs sent another copy of the demand letter to Defendant's
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business location at 123 West 12th Street Ogden, Utah. (R. 19; attached Addendum A)
7. On July 10,2009. Defendant was served a Summons and the Amended Complaint
at its new place of business. (R. 15)
8.

Matt McDonald, manager at Big Bubba's accepted sendee on behalf of

Defendant's Registered Agent. (R. 15)
9. On October 27,2009. three months after Defendant's answer was due, a Certificate
of Default was entered against Defendant. (R. 32)
10. Six months after the Certificate of Default was entered, the Defendant filed a
motion to have the certificate set aside. (R. 50)
11. At the oral argument on Defendant's motion, the parties agreed that the "good
cause" standard of Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c) was controlling in this case. (R. 197, p. 12)
12. The trial court determined that under Utah case law7, the factors used in
considering Rule 60(b) motions are analogous to the consideration of Rule 55(c) motions.
(R. 197, p. 6)
13. After applying the Rule 60(b) factors to the facts and circumstances of this case,
the trial court ordered that neither c;£ood cause" nor "excusable neglect" existed and
therefore denied the Defendant's motion. (R. 197, pp. 23 - 25)
14. On November 15,2010, Plaintiffs identified F. David Pierce as an expert witness
regarding safety of the Defendant's trailer. (R. 175)
15. In his report, Mr. Pierce discusses the design of the trailer that was used by the
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Jenkins; concluding thai this trailer was not designed for use by the general public but that
no such warnings or signs were posted on the trailer. (R. 179-180)
16. At the hearing for oral argument, a discussion amongst the parlies occurred
regarding discovery deadlines. The original scheduling order stated that fact discover)' cutoff was May 3 rd . 2010. (R. 25)
17. In addition to Plaintiffs request, Defendants also needed an extension of time for
taking the depositions of Plaintiffs* sons, Mike and Rick Jenkins, who were deposed on
October 19th, 2010. (R. 141)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
While Rule 55(c) does not set forth a specific test as to what constitutes good cause
for setting aside a default certificate, Utah courts have provided a standard to follow. This
standard focuses on the issue of excusable neglect, including whether the moving party has
control over the circumstances that led to the default certificate being entered. See Miller
v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690 (Utah App. 1992); Davis v. Goldsworthy, 1 84 P.3d 626 (Utah
App. 2008). While Rule 55(c) deals with certificates of default and Rule 60(b) deals with
default judgments, Utah courts have held that the factors described in Rule 60(b) are relevant
to the good cause determination under Rule 55(c). Id. One of these factors is whether
defendant can show excusable neglect, which means that the pail}7 had no control over the
circumstances leading to the entry of the default certificate. Miller at 693. If excusable
neglect is not shown, then the court does not need to go further and consider any additional
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factors. Miller at 694.
In this case, after considering written memoranda and oral arguments of both parties.
the trial court determined that Defendant's failure to respond to Plaintiffs complaint did not
constitute good cause under Rule 55(c). The trial court followed controlling Utah law:
therefore, it did not abuse its discretion.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE CERTIFICATE OF DEFAULT

A. Trial courts are granted considerable discretion when deciding to grant or
deny motions to vacate defaults, and Defendant cannot show an abuse of this discretion.

When reviewing decisions made by trial courts, appellate courts should "not disturb
the trial court's decision in such matters absent a clear abuse of such discretion'". Fackrell
v. Fackrell 740 P.2d 1318. 1320. (Utah 1987). Rule 55 provides procedures regarding
defaults, and states that "for good cause shown, the court may set aside an entr\ of default'*.
Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c) (emphasis added).fcCItis. of course, well-established that ^good cause*
determinations entail discretionary conclusions by the district court and will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion". Hendry v Schneider, 116 F.3d 446. 449 (10th Cir. 1997).
The Hendry court further held thatfcC[t]hetrial court abuses its discretion in determining
whether there is 'good cause* if its decision is arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical". Id. In
the instant case, the trial court's decision was based on the undisputed facts after both parties
had briefed and orally argued the issue. Thus, the decision was not arbitrary, capricious or
5

whimsical and should be affirmed.
The Utah Court of Appeals has also addressed the issue of setting aside an entry of
default certificate, specificalh discussing Utah R. Ci\. P. 55(c). holding that the trial court
has discretion in setting aside a default and that all doubts should be resolved 'in favor of
the defaulting parly". Miller v Brocksmith. 825 P.2d 690 (Utah App. 1992) However,
resoh ing doubts in favor of the defaulting party does not mean that the court must always
set aside a default certificate. fcC[B|eiore we will interfere with the trial court's exercise of
discretion, abuse of that discretion must be clearly shown"'. Katz v Piercc\ 732 P.2d 92. 93
(Utah 1986). The Katz court further held that simply because Defendant can provide a
reason that the default should be set aside "does not require tiie conclusion thai the court
abused its discretion in refusing to do so. when facts and circumstances support the refusal'*.
Id.
In this case, the trial court did not simply consider one factor in its decision. It issued
its order after considering both written and oral arguments, and found that under the facts and
circumstances of this case, Defendant "Tailed to show sufficient grounds to establish good
cause or excusable neglect" and therefore denied Defendant's motion. (See Order on
Defendant's, BigBubba's Trailer Mfg, Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate, R. 133.) In
doing so, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and its decision should not be disturbed.
B. Utah Courts have interpreted Rule 55(c) so there is no need to apply law from
outside of this jurisdiction.
Defendant asserts that the trial court applied an erroneous standard when ruling on the
6

motion to set aside the certificate of default. In support of this assertion. Defendant goes to
great lengths to cite cases from circuit courts outside of the 10th Circuit regarding the
interpretation of Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c).
However. Utah courts have clearly discussed "good cause" in the context of Rule
55(c). and have applied it to various cases. As held in May v. Thompson. 677 P.2d 1109
(Utah 1984). an order must be "based on adequate findings of fact" and "on the lawv. In this
case, the trial court issued clear findings of fact and an order that specificall} cites to and
follows controlling Utah lav7 and therefore, it did not abuse its discretion.
There is no specific test to apply in order to determine what is good cause for vacating
a default certificate. Utah courts have held that Rule 60(b) is relevant to this question. In
Miller v. Brocksmitk 825 P.2d 690 (Utah App. 1992). the appellate court upheld the trial
court's denial of a motion to set aside a certificate of default under Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c).
That court held thai Pvule 60(b) was relevant, and thus some of the "factors to be considered
include whether [defendant] "s failure constitutes excusable neglect and whether [defendant]
has presented a meritorious defense to the action". Miller at 693. The Miller court further
stated that, having determined that no excusable neglect existed, it was not necessary to go
further and examine whether a meritorious defense existed. Miller at 694.
In applying Miller to the case at bar, the trial court held that no excusable neglect
existed. The trial court determined Defendant was proper!}' served at its business address and
ignored the complaint for a period of nine months, which was simply too long to be excused.
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Based upon this finding, the trial court followed Miller and. having determined that no
excusable neglect existed, determined that it was not necessary to go further and examine
whether a meritorious defense existed.
In their oral arguments before the trial court, the parties also discussed Davis v
Goidsworthy. 1 84 P.3d 626 (Utah App. 2008). That court also used the Rule 60(b) factors
in making its decision regarding a default, holding that in order to demonstrate excusable
neglect, "the movant must show that he has used due diligence and thai he was prevented
from appearing by c ireumsiances over which he had no control". Goldsworthvai 630. (citing
Black \s Title, Inc.. 1999 LIT App 330) (emphasis added). There are no such circumstances
in ibis ease such ab intervening action of a third party, natural disaster place of business
destroyed by circumstances beyond its control, etc. Defendant was completely in control of
its own circumstances, and its pattern of inaction should not be excused.
Certainly, moving a business is difficult with things being misplaced and disorder
occurring for a period of time, causing a deadline to be missed for a short amount of time.
However, there is no dispute that Defendant was served at its new business address, that its
manager properly accepted service, that it had nine months to correct its error and only did
so after being notified by a co-defendant.
Moreover, Defendant is a business establishment that has a responsibility to act in a
business like manner. When it fails to act in a business like manner, as in this case, Plaintiffs
should not cany the burden of this failure. The trial court's decision was supported by
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findings of fact and b) case law. and the default resulted from events entirely within the
control of the Defendant. Consequently. the Defendant has not provided any justification for
this Court to find that the trial court abused its discretion.

II.

EVEN IF FEDERAL LAW IS APPLIED TO THIS CASE, DEFENDANT HAS
NOT SHOWN GOOD CAUSE WHY THE DEFAULT SHOULD BE SET
ASIDE
Defendant cites heavil} to various federal cases, mostl) from jurisdictions outside the

10th Circuit but also to one 10th Circuit case that was decided after the time that Defendant
filed this interlocutor)7 appeal. Plaintiff submits that Utah law exists that addresses the exact
facts and circumstances that are addressed by the case at bar. and are therefore controlling.
However, in the event that this Court is inclined to follow the cases cited by Defendant.
Plaintiff will address those issues here.
A. Rule 55(c) does not contain a specific test for determining "good cause",
therefore this Court is not required to consider anj or all of the factors cited by
Defendant.

In all of the cases cited by Defendant, the courts have considered the same general
factors in determining whether good cause exists for setting aside a default. These factors
are: (1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether a meritorious defense exists: and (3)
whether the nondefaulting party will be prejudiced. Marzilicmo v Heckler. 728 F.2d 151,
156 (2d Cir. 1984).
It is interesting to note that many courts, including a number of those cited in
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Defendant's brief have applied the same factors to the setting aside of default certificates
under Rule 55(c) as thc\ do to setting aside default judgments under Rule 60(b). See bnifed
Coin Meier C V;, Jnc v See/hoard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839 (6(h Cir. 1983); GoldkisL Jne
v Launnhuro ()U Co , Inc.L 756 ]\2d 14 (3d Cir. 1085); QIC Holdings, Jnc v Wright &
Lato, Inc., 979 K2d 60 (5th Cir. 1992); Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered v Imperial Adjusters,
Jnc , 28 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1994). I wen considering that the standard for "good cause" under
Rule 55(c) is lower than that of Rule 60(b). these three factors do not support Defendant's
contention that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused lo set aside the default.
In addition to these three factors. Defendant cites to the recent case o[Roth v Joseph
2010 UI App 332,

P.3d

. The Roih case is IKH factual!) comparable to the instant

case and thus has little relevance here.1 However, because Defendant has relied on the Roth
factors. Plaintiff will address the additional factors that court used in its decision.
Whatever this Court determines the list of factors to be. it does not need to consider
all factors, and may even consider other factors. In re Dierschkc, 975 F.2d 181. 183 (5th Cir.
1992). "Whatever factors are employed, the imperative is that they be regarded simply as a
means of identifying circumstances which warrant the finding of 'good cause" to set aside

1

In the Roth case, the defendant hospital filed its answer only twelve days late,
due to a clerical error on the part of the hospital's attorney. Further, the answer was filed
only three days after the default certificate was entered. Thus, the court determined that
the defendant acted expeditiously and that the plaintiff was not prejudiced. Roth v.
Joseph. 2010 UT App 332.
P.3d
. The facts of the instant case are significantly
different, in that the time delay was nine months and the error was completely within the
control of the Defendant.
10

a default.'' Id. at 184. Further, if the court finds that the Defendant's willful conduct resulted
in the entry of default, the court ma) refuse to set aside the default on that basis alone and
without considering am other factors. Id. (emphasis added). Consequent!}. if this Court
determines that Defendant's pattern of inaction that led to the certificate of default was
entirely within Defendant's control, the Court need not consider an} further factors.
B. The default judgment should not be set aside, because of Defendant's culpable
conduct.
The first factor courts have considered is whether Defendant's conduct is willful
which courts have also discussed as "culpable conduct''. Meadows v Dominican Republic,
817 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1987) : United States v Timbers Preserve, Routt Count)) Colo., 999
F.2d 452 (\0xh Cir. 1993). "A defendant's conduct is culpable if he has received actual or
constructive notice of the filing of the action and failed to answer". Meadows at 521.
In the case at bar. Defendant received actual notice of the complaint, as its manager
was served at its new business location in Ogden. Utah. However. Defendant failed to
respond and thus the default certificate was entered. Defendant alleges that its failure to
respond was due to the mistake or inadvertence of one of its employees, during the time it
was moving business locations.
However, no dispute exists as to whether the Defendant was actually served with the
complaint. Defendant does not allege that its failure to answer was due to circumstances
beyond its control, such as a natural disaster or act of God. The only excuse it has proffered
is that it failed to manage its paperwork and employees, circumstances that are completely
11

within Defendant's control. Defendant's failure to respond to the complaint, after being
properly served, can only be construed as culpable conduct.
C. Defendant has not met its burden of showing that it has a meritorious
defense.
The second factor to be discussed is whether the Defendant has a meritorious defense.
Under Utah law, the Court does not even need to consider this factor, because excusable
neglect does not exist. Miller v. BrocksmitK 825 P.2d 690. 694 (I Jtah App. 1992); Slate v.
Musselmcuu 667 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1983). The Miller court held that since it "found no
excusable neglect, it is not necessan to determine whether [the moving party J had a
meritorious defense". 825 P.2dat694. "Accordingly, since the trial court proper!) ruled that
there had been no excusable neglect, it clearly did not abuse its discretion in denying [thej
motion to set aside the default". Id. In the instant case, the trial court determined that
excusable neglect did not exist; therefore, under Miller, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion and its decision should be upheld.
However, even if this Court chooses to consider whether Defendant has a meritorious
defense, the Defendant has not met its burden. Defendant alleges thirty defenses in its
Answer, and alleges in its brief that these are meritorious defenses. Admittedly, the burden
to show a meritorious defense is not a substantial burden.
Though not substantial, a party must at least "plausibly suggest the existence of facts
which, if proven at trial, would constitute a cognizable defense". Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d
73, 77 (1st Cir. 1989). However, the Defendant has not proven any facts or circumstances
12

that would support its defenses. These are simph blanket defenses that it has asserted, then
asks this Court to consider them meritorious. "[AJ concluson allegation of a defense,
unsupported by facts underlying that defense, will not sustain the burden of the defaulting
parts'." Gomesv. Williams. 420 F'.2d 13 64. 1366 (10th Cir. 1970). Defendant has not proven
that its defenses are meritorious, and therefore cannot justify a reversal of the trial court's
decision.
Likewise. Defendant incorrecth represents that Plaintiffs own expert. David Pierce,
has expressed no opinions that would support Plaintiffs allegations that the trailer was
improper!} manufactured or designed. Defendant fails to understand that Mr. Pierce stated
in his report that the trailer was not designed for use b} the general public and that no
warning signs were posted on the trailer to advise the unsuspecting public of its dangers. (R.
179-180).
Further. Defendant uses an emergency room report to allege that Plaintiffs
representation of hov* she was injured are not supported b) said report. Again. Defendant
fails to understand what a report states. The emergenc} report states that Plaintiff presented
herself because of headaches, confusion, and neck pain. (Mckay-DeeHosp. Ctr.. Emergency
Dep't Report, April 2, 2007. attached as Ex. 10 to Pet. for Interlocutor}7 Appeal emphasis
added.) This record correlates with Petitioner's own medical expert. Dennis Wyman. M.D.
who diagnosed Plaintiff with post concussive syndrome, including short-term memoiy loss,
concentration problems, tinnitus, and poor judgment. (R. 158-163). These reports are
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completely consistent with the type of injury Plaintiff has suffered from the accident in
question. Therefore. Defendant's representation of the above reports have not supported its
argument that it has alleged meritorious defenses.
D. Defendant did not act expeditiously in this case, but waited nine months to
correct its error and consequently, the default should not be set aside.
The third factor, as discussed in Roth v. Joseph, is whether the Defendant acted
expeditiously in correcting its error. 2010 Iff App 332,

P.3d

. It is impossible to

believe that Defendant acted expeditiously in this case, given that it filed its motion nine
inonths after the complaint was served upon it. and six months after the default certificate
entered.
Interestingly, Defendant asks this Court to apply a practical and commonsense
application of this factor, but if waiting nine months to correct its own error is considered
expeditious, such a determination would directly contradict the trial court's practical and
commonsense application of the time delay. The delay in this instance which led to the
certificate of default was entirely within the control of the Defendant. The complaint was
properly served upon Defendant's manager at its new business location. In fact, had it not
been notified of the certificate of default by a co-defendant, Defendant's delay would have
almost certainly been longer.
Further, the fact that Plaintiffs did not notify Defendant of the entry of the certificate
of default is no excuse for Defendant's inaction. The Rules of Civil Procedure do not impose
a duty upon Plaintiff to provide an additional notice, only that Defendant answer the
14

summons and complain in the required time. Additionally, the Defendant is not arguing that
it did not have notice of the complaint: in fact, it admits that it was proper!}7 served and
therefore had notice of its deadline to respond. Therefore. Defendant was on notice that if
it ignored the complaint, that a default could be entered against it.
The delay was entirely within the control of the Defendant, and the fact that it hired
counsel as soon as it learned of the default certificate should not mitigate its actions in
completely ignoring the multiple demand letters and complaint that was served upon it. The
cases to which Defendant cites do not offer a basis for relief in this instance. In Roth, the
defendant took corrective action within twelve days of missing the deadline and in Menzies,
the court focused on the fact that defendant was ineffectively represented and that
defendant's counsel misled him regarding the missed deadline. Roth v. Joseph 2010 UT
App. 332; Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 2006).
Similar facts do not exist in this case - this Defendant was properh served, it had
constructive notice of the default certificate, and has willfull) disregarded the judicial
process, waiting nine months before responding to the complaint. Defendant's actions
simply cannot be construed as expeditious in an}7 sense of the word.
E. Defendant's delays have prejudiced the Plaintiffs in this case and as a result,
the default should not be set aside.
Courts have also considered whether Plaintiff will be prejudiced if the default is set
aside. Defendant states that Plaintiff would not suffer substantial prejudice if the default is
set aside. However, this is simply not true and is not supported by the facts and
15

circumstances of this case.
\ s discussed previous!). Plaintiff was injured over three years ago and has suffered
multiple delays at the hand ol the Defendant herein. Defendant did not respond lo multiple
demand packages, and did not respond to the complaint that was served upon it. Plaintiff
was evcntualh able to establish liability against Defendant and then, nine months after the
default was entered, Defendant finally responded to Plaintiffs service of its complaint.
In its own interest. Defendant would have this Court believe that this delay has not
prejudiced the Plaintiff. However, Plaintiff believes that if Defendant were to suffer similar
delays at the hands of its business vendors and suppliers, that it would consider the delay
prejudicial lo its business affairs and economical well-being.
Further, in addition to the delays already suffered, the appeal process has further
prejudiced Plaintiff. But for the fact that Defendant ignored the complaint that was served
upon it Plaintiff would not be in the position she finds herself in. Plaintiff has worked
within the procedures established by the Rules of Civil Procedure, and it is onl) fair to expect
the Defendant to do the same. Justice only works if it is orderly, the rules exist for a reason,
and Defendant deliberately chose not to follow the rules.
Defendant wants to excuse its own culpable behavior by pointing to the Plaintiff and
its request for an extension of a deadline. Defendant omits that Defendants needed additional
time to depose Plaintiffs' sons, Mike and Rick Jenkins, and did so more than three months
after the original discovery cut-off date. (R. 25, 141). Certainly, there is a difference
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between working within the parameters of discovery deadlines and requesting extensions
when dates previously agreed to will not work due to unforseen circumstances, versus
Defendant's failure to acknowledge a served complaint for nine months. To allow Defendant
to flaunt the rules is bad precedent: therefore, the default certificate should not be set aside.
F. Public interest does not support setting aside the default.
The final factor Defendant would have this court consider is whether public interest
is implicated. Although courts may ''favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity
for a hearing on the merits of ever}7 case". Defendant has not shown that he has been denied
an opportunity for hearing at all. Heathman v Fabian & Clendenin. 377 P.2d 189 (Utah
1962) (emphasis added).
In fact, not only did Defendant have an opportunity7 for hearing, its culpable conduct
is the reason for this proceeding. Ms. Jenkins was injured over three years ago. and properly
served the Defendant who ignored the complaint for over nine months. Defendant had a fair
opportunity to have its case heard, and due to Defendant's own inaction, the default
certificate was entered.
Additionally, the default certificate has only established liability against the
Defendant. No judgment has been entered against the Defendant, and it still has the
opportunity to litigate the damages portion of this case. Thus, this case differs from those
relied on by Defendant, which deal with default judgments. Defendant has not been ordered
to pay a judgment in this case, nor has Plaintiff moved for a judgment to be entered. The
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default certificate only establishes liability against Defendant, there is still the damages
portion of this litigation in which Defendant has full opportunity to defend itself Therefore.
public interest does not mandate that the trial court's decision be overturned.
On the contrary .public interest actually supports upholding the trial court's decision.
The public interest favors expecting parties in a lawsuit to be bound by the Rules of Civil
Procedure. It also favors expecting a business to act appropriately in its affairs. In this case.
the Defendant disregarded Ms. Jenkins' claims, it culpably ignored the complaint that was
properly served upon it, and it now complains of injustice for its own failure. Contrary to
Defendant's claim, public interest is served by following the procedures and orders of the
court, not by disregarding the judicial process.
III.

THE ENTRY OF THE DEFAULT CERTIFICATE WILL NOT LEAD TO
CONFUSION AND INCONSISTENCY
Defendant's final allegation contained its brief is that the trial court's denial of the

motion to set aside the default certificate will lead to inconsistent judgment. However,
Defendant's allegations are misplaced. In the 1872 case upon which Defendant relies, Prow
v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, the parties were accused of joint fraud. That case cannot be
reasonably applied to the facts of the instant case.
In the present case, Plaintiff has brought separate causes of action against each of the
defendants. Consequently, each defendant can be found separately liable, and a judgment
against one defendant will not automatically lead to a judgment against both. Defendant's
argument assumes that at trial, the court will not be able to issue appropriate jury instructions
18

to inform the jury of the different causes of action and what must be proved as to each
defendant.
Further. Defendant's argument assumes that members of a jury will not be
knowledgeable enough to understand the difference between the two defendants5 positions
in this case, or that the jury would not be able to understand the trial court's instructions
pertaining to the circumstances of this case. Such assumptions are dangerous and are not
credible, because the}' undermine the competency of our judicial system. Procedures exist
in our system b} which this case can proceed, resulting in a trial and judgments that are
consistent as to each defendant. Consequently, the trial court's decision should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
In sum. Defendant has failed in its attempt to establish "good cause'" for vacating the
default. The only harm cited is the trial court's refusal to see things Defendant's way. which
is not sufficient reason for this Court to reverse the trial court's order.

The Defendant

culpably ignored, delayed and frustrated the legal process that Plaintiff instituted against it
and did not act expeditiously to correct its inaction. Further. Defendant was in complete
control of its own actions, and it has failed to allege any facts and circumstances by which
this Court could consider that excusable neglect exists. Under Utah law the Court need not
consider any further factors and the trial court's decision should be upheld. Consequently,
the facts and circumstances of this case demand that the Defendant be held responsible for
its own actions.
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WHEREFORE. Plaintiff submits that the Defendant has not shown that the trial court
abused its discretion and respectfully requests that this Court deny Defendant \s Appeal of the
Interlocutory Order.
DATED this C^I

day of February. 2011.

COGGINS, LARREAU & LYTHGOE, PC

Attorneys fitf Plaintiff
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